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THESIS SUMMARY
My interest in studying income inequality in Brazil started during my study abroad in
Salvador, Brazil in the Northeast of the country in Spring 2016. Before arriving, I was aware
that Brazil’s economy had seen a major boom prior the recession that began in 2015. From my
short time in the city, it was apparent that Salvador was rapidly changing, but I became doubtful
of how this development was impacting all citizens. Extravagant shopping malls and luxurious
amenities seemed to arise everyday; however these spaces were primarily accessible to white,
upper class citizens, which account for less than 10% of the city’s population. Moreover, I had
the unique opportunity to study abroad in Brazil during a major shift in the nation’s political
structure, the impeachment of President Dilma Rousseff. Rousseff’s impeachment coincided
with corruption charges against her predecessor, Luis Inácio Lula da Silva (Lula). As Rousseff
was considered Lula’s handpicked successor to the presidency, these charges of corruption
destroyed the credibility of the Workers’ Party, a leftist political party founded by Lula.
Corruption allegations also led to increased critical reflection of both Lula and Rousseff’s
accomplishments, because it seemed impossible that a person bribed by a large company could
also fight for the citizens of the nation.
. During this Workers’ Party’s time in power, issues surrounding race and gender were
brought to light, new social programs were introduced meant to benefit the poorest citizens in the
country, and national income inequality greatly decreased. I came across a government report
with GINI scores, a measure of income inequality, for Brazilian municipalities from 2000 to
2010, a time frame that includes the full duration of Lula’s presidency. With this information, I
would be able to conduct an economic analysis showing how Brazil changed under Lula’s
administration, and how policy objectives compared with economic outcomes. I felt it was
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important to bolster this economic analysis with extensive background about Lula’s rise to power
and existing causes of income inequality in Brazil in order to contextualize these economic
changes.
My thesis begins with background information on the importance of studying income
inequality, and the negative ramifications of high-income inequality. I provide an overview of
the significance of Lula’s election, as well as a brief discussion of the social and economic
policies he introduced as president and how these policies encourage engagement with the
formal sector. My thesis presents empirical analysis of variations in income inequality reduction
across the different regions of the country. Through this research, I was able to observe how
greatly income equality varied across different regions in Brazil and how different regions were
markedly more successful at reducing income inequality. Finally, I conduct a regression analysis
to determine the role of regional differences and engagement with the formal sector to analyze
what factors contribute to the variations in income inequality reduction across municipalities.
Through this research, it became apparent that despite a national trend of inequality
reduction, this positive change did not impact all citizens of the country. In fact, it seemed to
favor regions of the country with greater levels of capital and engagement with the formal sector
development. My thesis results pave the way for future research on the factors that inhibit
inequality reduction in Brazil. Furthermore, this thesis makes the case that with such variation
across regions in levels of inequality, a national policy aimed to reduce income inequality must
allow different regions and municipalities to customize their efforts to best fit the needs and
issues facing their citizens.
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ABSTRACT
This thesis analyzes trends in income inequality reduction across different regions of
Brazil from 2000 to 2010. This period was selected because it was a period of consistent
economic growth and national inequality reduction, as measured by the GINI Index, as well as a
period that witnessed the introduction of new government policies by President Lula da Silva.
This thesis provides extensive background information about Lula’s presidency and income
inequality in Brazil before conducting an economic analysis of the trends in income inequality
reduction through the country. This thesis concludes that the trend of inequality reduction
favored certain regions of the country and also favored municipalities that were more adept at
encouraging participation in the formal sector. This means that although the North and
Northeastern regions of the country received the highest amount of new government benefit
payments, the regions were still less successful at reducing income inequality than the more
historically wealthy regions of the country. The ramifications of this research show that although
income inequality generally decreased during this time, greater national effort is needed to
address the structural and historic factors that perpetuate regional inequality in Brazil.
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BACKGROUND
In the field of economic development, Brazil’s progress in the first decade of the 21st
century is often considered a model for how a country can achieve a development model that
reduces poverty and promotes equality. Empirically this praise is warranted. In 1983, nearly half
(49.3%) of Brazil’s citizens lived on under $3.10 a day and according to the most recent figures
(2014) from the World Bank, only 7.56% of the countries citizens fell below this poverty line
(World Bank). The GINI Index is a tool used by economists to measure relative inequality in a
country by calculating how income is distributed amongst a country’s citizens. A nation with
perfect equality would have a GINI Index of zero; meaning that every citizen has the same
income, and a perfectly unequal nation would have a score of 100, meaning that one individual
controls all of the income in the nation. Per the World Bank, in addition to reducing poverty
levels, Brazil has also reduced income inequality from its all-time high GINI Index of 63.3 in
1989 to 51.48 in 2014 (World Bank).
Figure 1
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Notably, the most sustained period of decline in inequality shown in Figure 1 occurred
from 2001 to 2009 reflecting both an upswing in economic climate as well as a series of
progressive social policies implemented by President Lula da Silva. The reductions Brazil
witnessed in poverty and inequality were accompanied by major shifts in Brazil’s economic
system as well as demographic structure. In the past 50 years the percentage of Brazilians living
in urban areas has jumped significantly from 46% to 85% (World Bank). Figure 2 below
demonstrates Brazil’s percent urban population compared to that of the United States, showing
the extreme change the country has seen in urban-rural structure.
Figure 2

Source: World Bank 2017
Of all the policies implemented by President Lula da Silva, Bolsa Família is the program
that has gained the most international recognition. The program, which was introduced in 2003,
is a conditional cash transfer program that combined previous welfare programs into a more
cohesive program meant to alleviate the impacts of poverty on low-income Brazilians.
Participants in the program must register in their respective municipality and adhere to certain
program standards to continue to receive benefit payments. These standards include minimum
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health and educational requirements for children, which will be discussed in the Bolsa Família
section of this paper. Bolsa Família currently provides payments to 13.9 million Brazilian
families, roughly one quarter of the country’s population (“Bolsa Família”). The success of this
program has led many other countries to adopt condition cash transfer payment models in their
national development plans. In 2004, the United Nations, World Bank, and Brazilian government
launched the Brazil Learning Initiative for a World without Poverty to share the results and
lessons Brazil learned from Bolsa Família with the rest of the world (“What is WWP?”).
While Bolsa Família has generated results, and Brazil as a whole has seen reductions in
poverty and inequality, the dialogue on Brazil’s development often stops there. At the most basic
level, a decreasing GINI coefficient represents an increase in wages for low-income citizens,
however, the formalization of the Brazilian labor market and other economic changes are less
studied in academic literature on this time period. The purpose of this research is to shed light on
the huge variation Brazil witnessed in inequality reduction across different regions and within
regions of the country during the 2000 to 2010 timespan and to evaluate the historic and cultural
factors that explain this variation. A one-size-fits-all poverty reduction plan, such as Bolsa
Família, will inevitably have different levels of effectiveness based on existing structural and
social norms within a given region. Across the 5,565 municipalities in Brazil, from 2000 to 2010,
1133 saw no change or an increase in income inequality according to their respective GINI
scores (Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada et al.). In order to have a better understanding
of Brazil’s economic and social development, it is important to look at results at between
regions, acknowledging that inequality in the bustling metropolis of São Paulo has a different
form than in a sparsely populated town in the Amazonas region of the country. This research
begins with a broad literature review discussing the general body of knowledge on income
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inequality before focusing on the historical context of economic and social development in
Brazil, the structure of Bolsa Família, and a statistical overview of inequality across Brazil.
Finally, a brief economic analysis of the relationship between income inequality, regional
inequity and formal employment in order to determine the impacts of Bolsa Família and formal
employment on inequality reduction across Brazilian municipalities.
Why Study Income Inequality?
Inequality as a descriptive term is used to describe far more elements of quality of life
than economic power alone. In Inequality Matters, by Prudence Carter and Sean Reardon, the
four domains of socioeconomic, health, political, and sociocultural inequality and their
relationships are analyzed in the greater discussion surrounding inequality in the United States.
An individual’s access to financial capital, for example, can be limited by corrupt political
structures within their country. Furthermore, if an individual is limited by certain health
constraints, the ways they utilize financial capital will have a different impact on their wellbeing
than it would for a healthy individual. This serves to explain that the conversation of inequality is
far more complicated than the question of income levels alone. That being said, income
inequality can serve as a metric that reflects other issues at play within a given society. It is also
a more accessible tool that is easier to quantify than the prevailing attitudes or underlying social
norms that shape a community.
The relationship between economic growth and income inequality is often debated. Some
level of income inequality is necessary to spur growth within an economy because certain
individuals will have more capacity to create jobs and higher returns to investment if there is
some level of imbalance in income distribution. However, if taken too far, income inequality can
have negative ramifications for economic growth (Berg and Ostry 4). An IMF staff publication
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by Andrew Berg and Jonathan Ostry discusses the relationship between sustained periods of
economic growth and income inequality as measured by the GINI coefficient of different
countries. Economic growth is not constant; there are periods where growth is extremely fast that
are sometimes followed by a slow period of decline. In the long-term, a general trend of
sustained growth is beneficial to reduce poverty levels in any given country (Berg and Ostry 3).
This research concluded that nations with higher income inequality were likely to have more
turbulent growth, meaning shorter cycles of growth and decline. These short cycles are an
impediment to the sustained growth necessary for long-term poverty reduction (Antoine et al. 5).
Income inequality can lead to changes in prevailing attitudes and social relationships
within a country. Extreme income inequality can serve as a social indicator that is linked to
higher levels of unhappiness. A study by Shigehiro Oishi, Selin Kesebir and Ed Diener revealed
that in the United States, periods of higher levels of income inequality were correlated with
higher levels of unhappiness. This research was conducted by comparing GINI coefficients with
national survey responses regarding income level and happiness. The impacts of income
inequality on unhappiness had the greatest impact on the poorest citizens in the country (Oishi et
al. 1098). This is explained because as a general rule, income inequality as measured by a GINI
coefficient will increase the most when wealthy individuals in a nation possess a greater share of
the wealth compared to the poorest individuals. During a period with a higher GINI coefficient,
the bottom quintile of a nation in terms of wealth will have less income, and thus less purchasing
power than the top quintile. Most notably, this research determined the role of perceptions of
inequality on levels of happiness. To measure perceptions of inequality, survey participants were
asked to rank how trustworthy and how fair they perceived other individuals to be. During
periods of increased income inequality, Americans perceived other individuals to be less fair and
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less trustworthy than compared to periods of relative equality. Moreover, it was determined that
for lower income individuals, the reduction in happiness resulting from periods of higher
inequality was explained by these changed perceptions as opposed to changes in income (Oishi
et al. 1098). The strong association between inequality and perceptions of fairness show how
high income inequality can lead to negative attitudes between social classes that
disproportionally impacts lower classes. This sort of resentment weakens a community by
preventing cohesion and the ability to work together towards a common goal.
Inequality Matters outlines a few key areas where the current academic study of
inequality is lacking. Most research on inequality is lumped within research on poverty, implying
that the problem of inequality is a “problem of poverty” (Reardon and Carter 13). This leads to
research questions that focus on topics such as “Why are people poor?” and “What are the effects
of poverty?” Inequality Matters argues for placing a greater emphasis on the structural issues and
ramifications of inequality within a society. This results in a new line of questioning: “Why is
there so much inequality in socioeconomic conditions, health outcomes, and the distribution of
political power?” and “What are the consequences of inequality for society?” Analysis through
this framework allows for a better understanding of how inequality will lead to different
outcomes and opportunities for different groups. Inequality is complex and intersectional. It is
not simply the product of other issues in a country, but a system of cultural norms that builds
upon itself. If the wealthiest, dominant group in a country controls the design of educational,
health and media systems, those who fall outside of this dominant group will inevitably have
more difficulty excelling in these systems and this contributes to persistent inequity.
By studying income inequality we can arrive to a further understanding of structural
inefficiencies within a given society. It is important to keep in mind that income inequality
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should be interpreted as an indicator of other inefficiencies. Racial, political, and cultural
inequalities are all intertwined with income. Next we will explore the recent history of inequality
in different regions of Brazil and efforts to reduce poverty.
Country Context during Lula Election
The 2002 election of President Lula da Silva marked a radical change for Brazilian
politics and an era of representation for the impoverished population long ignored in the political
sphere. For most of Brazilian history, a disproportionate amount of political power, and a
disproportionate percentage of the country’s wealthy, white population existed in the South and
Southeast of the country (Telles 166). Lula’s Workers’ Party, a leftist party dedicated to social
progress, openly criticized Brazilian political norms and injustices of the state against its people
(“Nossa História”). The figure of Lula alone, a man born in the rural Northeast of Brazil with no
college education, symbolized that it was time for a change. This change would entail targeted
efforts at improving quality of life for Brazilians, by reducing poverty and inequality and
advocating for improved health, education, and human rights for all (“Nossa História”). The
party promised to defend the worker, while also promoting the economic growth necessary to lift
the country out of poverty. Lula was able to create ethos in his campaign rhetoric by drawing
upon his own past as a factory worker. The promises of this campaign had a particularly strong
appeal to citizens in the Northeast and North of the country, two regions that had historically
higher rates of poverty than the rest of the nation, and two regions that had less influence in
shaping Brazilian politics.
In terms of inequality, Lula was presented with not only the issue of income inequality
hindering economic growth, but also serious issues of race and gender inequality that had long
been pushed aside by politicians. Income inequality in Brazil is not just an economic
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phenomenon, it is a product of racial inequality and a systematic oppression of black and
indigenous peoples and these issues have ramifications at the national level as well as the local
level. High national income inequality reflected the major disparity in wealth in the nation as a
whole, with the South and Southeast possessing a disproportionate amount of the nation’s wealth
and the North and Northeastern regions becoming associated with poverty. In terms of GDP
generation, the North and Northeast respectively generated just 4.5% and 13.1% of the nation’s
total GDP in 1998 and both regions had a GDP per capita close to half of GDP per capita in the
Southeast region at the time of Lula’s candidacy (Lemos 14). While large cities boomed in
southern regions of the country spurring further growth, the North and Northeast were slower to
develop and continued to have significantly higher levels of poverty than other regions of the
country. The Northeast in particular was slower to industrialize and had a large proportion of
informal economic activity (Telles 144). In addition to having higher levels of poverty, the North
and Northeast have historically struggled with high income inequality as a byproduct of the
slavery systems that shaped the development of these regions.
At the local level, Brazil, a nation whose history is inextricably linked to slavery and the
plantation system, struggled to negotiate formal space for black, indigenous, and female
Brazilians after the official abolition of slavery in 1888. Due to this failure to construct formal
space for all population groups, income inequality was not just a macro-economic issue creating
a north-south dichotomy, but an issue that had a large effect on daily life for the majority of
Brazilians. Under the slavery system, white men held property and wealth, and this same landed
class made political decisions, meaning a lack of power and land for anyone who didn’t fit into
this dominant plantation-master ideal. This helped contribute to a pattern of high-income
inequality and disparate distribution of resources and wealth within Brazilian towns and cities
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that continued into industrialization. Within these restrictive confines, Brazilians were able to
create creative communities that were self-sustaining without formal support or government
recognition, however economic measures cannot often quantify these intangible traits. From the
1950’s onward, rapid urbanization in Brazil contributed to the development of an informal
economy and informal settlements in cities characterized by a lack of official property rights and
employment in the informal sector. These informal settlements, favelas, are surrounded by
extreme stigma despite the major contributions they provide to Brazilian society (Perlman 8).
Historically negative perceptions of marginalized individuals by the state and vice versa
contribute to the framework of national development in Brazil.
A study of Brazilian development would be misguided if it overlooked the crucial role of
the informal economy. However, a national development plan, such as the one promoted by Lula
and the Workers’ Party by nature requires some level of formality and increased interactions
between citizens and the state. In order to make his impact, Lula had to work to renegotiate how
citizens viewed the government and incentivize participation in the formal sector.
Precedent for Social Programs
Prior to the late 20th century, the development of government welfare programs in
modern Brazil was largely suppressed by frequent regime changes and the lack of a political
process focused on social development. In the absence of government welfare programs, social
protection was linked to the formal labor market, privileging the status of primarily white
workers and providing little assistance to the rest of the population. The introduction of the
democratic government outlined in the 1988 constitution paved the way for a new series of social
protection policies. Before this point, the only existing form of welfare was a pension program
for rural workers (Soares 3). The 1988 constitution established the national social security
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program, Benefício de Prestação Continuada (BPC), which provides a benefit payment to
elderly Brazilians living below the poverty level as well as Brazilians with deficiencies. The
BPC program still provides payments to millions of Brazilians.
In 1991, as poverty started to gain recognition as an issue that the government needed to
address, Senator Eduardo Suplicy proposed a bill to provide transfer payments to citizens earning
less than minimum wage. This proposal did not pass the senate, but four years later, three
different cities would introduce their own versions of conditional cash transfer programs (CCT),
starting a new wave of social welfare programs. Brazil introduced its first national CCT program
in 1996, which focused on the eradication of child labor, by providing different transfer
payments to urban and rural households. This program was followed by a program that provided
cash transfers for families meeting school attendance requirements, and another cash transfer that
included the same school attendance requirements but added the conditionality that families
would have to get children younger than six vaccinated. In the meantime, many Brazilian cities
continued to implement their own CCT programs. In 2003, President Lula introduced a fourth
national cash transfer program, Cartão Alimentação, which provided a transfer payment that
could be used exclusively to buy food. These programs were all run by different agencies,
meaning it would be possible for a family to receive over four different benefit payments, or
none, if they had not applied to receive them. This confusion and administrative difficulty
ultimately was overcome with the introduction of Bolsa Família, which could be best described
as the reorganization and expansion of extant ideas about welfare and poverty reduction (Soares
4). The 6.7 million families registered under other CCT programs were incorporated into Bolsa
Família, which set a national target to cover 11 million families by 2006 (Soares 6). By
introducing Bolsa Família, Brazil was able to eliminate redundant benefits and create an
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organized means for vulnerable families to access payments they needed.

POLICY REFORM UNDER LULA DA SILVA
Labor Reform
True to the campaign platform, Lula and the Workers’ Party advocated for and created
many laws to empower working class Brazilians. Many of the advances experienced by working
class Brazilians were negotiated through the work of labor unions, which were supported through
the National Labor Fourm (Almeida 55). During his two terms as president, Lula consistently
raised the minimum wage. From 2003 to 2014 under the Workers’ Party, minimum wage in
Brazil increased by 76.2% (Weisbrot et al. 3). This major increase in minimum salary can help to
explain why income growth for low-income citizens in Brazil outpaced income growth of highincome citizens during the Lula presidency, helping to shrink the nation’s income gap. However,
a minimum wage can only guarantee higher wages for individuals employed in the formal sector,
which in some municipalities is as low as one third of working age individuals (Instituto de
Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada et al.). The protections extended to workers under Lula went
beyond the employed population; from 2003 to 2012, the amount of Brazilians covered by
unemployment insurance increased by 99.2% (Summa 12). After a brief period of decline, the
increased negotiating power of labor unions helped contribute to increases in real salaries across
all sectors after 2006 (Summa 18). Overall, at the end of Lula’s presidency in 2010, the income
of Brazilians employed in the formal sector was higher and more secure than when he took
office. Furthermore, increases in participation in the formal sector meant that more and more
Brazilians could benefit from these economic protections.
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Other Social Programs
Before discussing Bolsa Família and the significance of the program for inequality
reduction in Brazil, it is important to recognize that Bolsa Família, while perhaps the most
recognized program, was not the only policy implemented by Lula aimed to reduce national
inequality and it should be studied within the greater context of the Lula presidency. Various
other programs contributed to the battle against inequality, even if they did not do so in the form
of a cash payment. To empower groups such as women, indigenous peoples, and afro-Brazilians
long unrecognized in Brazilian politics, Lula created new cabinet positions, such as the Secretary
of Policies for the Promotion of Racial Equality and a Secretary of Policies for Women. The
importance of state recognition of property rights was another crucial element of the Lula
presidency, including the recognition of informal Quilombo communities. However, registering
property with the government does not exclusively bring advantages to inhabitants. With formal
recognition of ownership comes new taxes, placing a greater burden on low-income citizens.
Bolsa Família
Bolsa Família was introduced in 2003 with the objective of combating hunger and
poverty through a cash transfer payment for the nation’s poorest citizens. This benefit payment
was meant to guarantee the basic rights of health, education, social assistance, and food security
so that families would be able to exit their situation of vulnerability. The program targets poverty
both in the short and long term. In the short term, families can use the transfer payments to
alleviate the immediate needs of poverty such as hunger. In the long term, the conditionalities of
Bolsa Família aim to break the cycle of poverty by ensuring that children receive an education
and medical treatment. As poverty rates are much higher in the North and Northeast of the
nation, these regions have the highest share of program participants (IPEA).
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While the primary objective of Bolsa Família was poverty reduction, the program is
perhaps Brazil’s greatest national effort to reduce inequality and the program is credited for
anywhere from one-fifth to one-third of the reduction in income inequality that occurred from
2001 to 2004 (Soares 20). Bolsa aims to reduce income inequality through the premise that
education is the factor that separates the wealthiest and poorest citizens in a nation; if poor
citizens can receive the same education, the gap between the two classes will shrink. The cash
transfers and conditionalities of Bolsa Família also promote the reduction of social inequalities
by guaranteeing that all children have access to the education and health resources necessary for
their personal wellbeing. If children are healthy and well educated, they will be able to contribute
to the workforce and society as a whole in order to improve their quality of life.
Administration of Bolsa Família
While Bolsa Família is a national program, it is administered at the municipal level,
meaning that the responsibilities of managing the program are delegated to the local government.
In order to receive benefits, individuals must have a government issued ID, which they will then
present to their municipal government so they can be registered in the Cadastro Único system.
Cadastro Único is the federal system, which keeps track of all beneficiaries and the payments
they should receive. Eligibility for Bolsa Família is determined through the Ministry of Social
Development based on the income level registered in the Cadastro Único system. Families who
are considered to live in extreme poverty or poverty are eligible for the program. One unique
element of Bolsa Família is that eligibility is determined at the household level as opposed to the
individual level, meaning the average income of all individuals in a home is used as opposed to
just the income of one parent.

18

The following income requirements are used to determine program eligibility:
•
•

Extreme Poverty: Monthly income per family member between R$0 and R$85
($27.50)
Poverty: Monthly income per family member between R$85.01 ($27.51) and R$170
($54.90)

The amount of benefit a family receives depends on the family’s income level as well as family
characteristics. Families classified in situations of extreme poverty are the primary targets for the
program and thus eligible for the largest amount of benefits. Families with children and
expecting mothers are able to receive additional benefits.
Program benefits are broken down into the following three categories:
•

Basic Benefit: R$85 ($27.50) monthly exclusively for families classified in extreme
poverty

•

Variable Benefit: Up to five separate payments of R$39 ($12.50) monthly for each
family member in the following subcategories
o Children between 0 and fifteen years old
o Pregnant women
o Infants between 0 and six months old

•

Adolescent Variable Benefit: Up to two payments of R$46 ($14.70) monthly for each
family member between the ages of sixteen and seventeen ("Bolsa Família")

Based on the limitations of the number of benefits receivable, the maximum amount a family can
receive from the Basic, Variable and Adolescent Variable payments is limited to R$372.00
($119) per month. An additional payment is available to families in situations of extreme poverty
entitled Benefit to Overcome Extreme Poverty. Eligibility for his benefit is determined based on
family income after Bolsa Família transfer payments are included.
Bolsa Família is a conditional cash transfer model, which means that participants must
adhere to program regulations in order to continue receiving payments. This creates a dualsystem of accountability in which participants must abide by program requirements and the local
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government must provide all necessary services for participants. The program requirements
encourage the following positive health and educational practices.
•

Health Conditionalities:
o Maintain vaccinations for children between zero and seven years of age
o Attend pre-natal consultations (pregnant women)
o Participate in educational programs about breast-feeding and healthy eating
(women who breast-feed)

•

Education Conditionalities
o School attendance rates of at least 85% for children between six and fifteen years
old
o School attendance rates of at least 75% for adolescents between sixteen and
seventeen years old ("Bolsa Família”)

While the value of the benefit payments has steadily increased over time to reflect changes in
cost of living, the program has undergone relatively few changes since its inception. The
program has consistently increased in enrollment since its inception.

LITERATURE REVIEW
Bolsa Família
The impact of Bolsa Família and the structure of the program have been extensively
analyzed in academic literature. In general, the program is considered to be a success in terms of
clear improvements to school and health participation of program participants for a relatively
small investment on behalf of the government (under 1% of the nation’s GDP) (Soares 6).
However, the objectives of the program raise some important questions. According to Sergei
Soares of the Brazilian Institute for Applied Economic Research, Bolsa Família rides the line
between a social protection program and an opportunity-generating program, which means that
the program does not truly accomplish either goal (Soares 9). Conditionalities imply that the cash
transfer is not is not a guarantee of income protection for all low income Brazilians, meaning that

20

it does not offer total social protection. Moreover, while school attendance and basic health are
crucial for poverty reduction, the conditionalities set by Bolsa Família are not particularly
difficult for families to achieve and they do little to increase capacity of program participants. In
order for Bolsa Família to generate opportunities for participants, Soares argues it would need to
provide either some sort of career training or incentivize higher education. Furthermore, the
transfer payments provided by Bolsa Família are relatively small. Using a poverty line of R$120,
Bolsa Família only caused an 8% reduction in the percentage of the population living in poverty.
However, the program did cause an 18% reduction in the nation’s poverty gap because the
transfer payment was enough to increase the income of some families to over the poverty line
(Sátyro and Soares 27).
Partially attributed to Bolsa Família, Brazil witnessed major improvements to school
enrollment rates from 2000 to 2010. From 2005 to 2010, the percentage of six year olds enrolled
in primary school increased from 83% to 92% (Chavez 7). School attendance amongst program
participants has also increased by about 3.6% since the program’s inception (Chavez 7). The
conformity of program participants to school attendance conditionalities is more effectively
monitored than abidance to health conditionalities, and by 2010, the federal government was able
to monitor the school attendance of over 85% of program participants (Soares 10). One major
criticism of Bolsa Família outlined by Chavez regarding the program’s education conditionality
is the fact that increasing school attendance does not necessarily increase the quality of education
that students receive. The program does not provide extra funding to schools in low-income
areas with high program participation and student achievement can be restricted in this way. If
education is in fact the key to inequality reduction, as Bolsa Família organizers claim, it seems
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that greater investment in reducing educational inequity should be the next logical step in
Brazil’s social policy development.
One fear often associated with social welfare programs is the concern that individuals
will forgo working and searching for employment and choose to sustain themselves from
government payments. This topic is particularly interesting in the realm of Bolsa Família,
through which the maximum possible monthly payment receivable is only about one third of
monthly minimum wage, meaning that Bolsa Família participation alone is not enough to allow
a family to live comfortably. In order to receive transfer payments from the program, a family
must actively register with their municipality and present appropriate government issued
identification. To receive a greater transfer payment these individuals would then have to lie
about their income levels, concealing income generated from the informal sector. Because Bolsa
Família does not provide enough income to stop working altogether, participation in the program
could incentivize participation in the informal sector as opposed to the formal sector. However,
to date, research does not indicate that Bolsa Família participation has a major impact on labor
force participation, refuting the claims of critics of the program (Soares 25).
There is increasing literature measuring the positive social effects of Bolsa Família
beyond the program’s conditionalities, including positive impacts on female empowerment and
eliminating aspects of social isolation associated with poverty. For women who receive Bolsa
Família on behalf of their families, the process of registering with the municipal government by
presenting government issued IDs can signify a greater level of civic engagement. This increased
civic engagement provides greater autonomy to women, and female participants in Bolsa
Família feel more independent and able to care for their families (Paes-Sousa and Rômulo 149).
The positive social impacts extend to the community as well and recent research aims to quantify
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the positive spillovers of the program. Research conducted in São Paulo has determined that
Bolsa Família participation has positive impacts on crime reduction, particularly with crimes
related to income such as theft and robberies (Chioda et al. 1).
Inequality Reduction
Perhaps because the program is unique to Brazil, the role of Bolsa Família in income
inequality reduction has received a significant amount of attention in the international
community. While Bolsa Família may represent a key part of inequality reduction in Brazil,
economic changes had a far greater influence on this process simply because income inequality
is a reflection of the distribution of wealth in a country. An extensive report on income inequality
reduction by the Brazilian IPEA in 2007 studies the change in income inequality in the nation
from 1998 to 2005 and this report is able to observe the changes that occur as a result of the
implementation of Bolsa Família in 2003. According to this report, 66% of the reduction in the
nation’s GINI score during this time period is attributed to changes in total income from work
(Barros et al. 39). The calculations done by the IPEA attribute 23.7% of the GINI reduction in
this time period to increases in government transfer payments including Bolsa Família.
Unfortunately, due to limited data this report was not able to determine the effects of transfer
payments in the Northern region of the country. The report did determine that during the first
years of Bolsa Família, the program had a significantly higher impact on income inequality
reduction in the Northeast of the country. Particularly, from 2002 to 2004, transfer payments
(including Bolsa Família) were accredited with 87% of the reduction in per capita GINI
coefficients in the Northeast (Barros et al. 39). Per this study, other regions did not even attribute
one-third of per capita income inequality reduction to transfer payments, which shows the high
importance of Bolsa Família participation in the Northeast (Barros et al. 38).
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From 2001 to 2005, the Brazilian marketplace progressed towards more equal pay for
men and women as well and black and white employees. In 2001, men received an average
salary 58.1% greater than females with the same qualifications, but this gap reduced by two
percentage points by 2005. The disparity between salaries of male and female workers is greater
than the disparity between black and white workers in Brazil, but race unfortunately plays a part
in determining an individual’s expected salary. From 2001 to 2005 the percent difference of
earnings received by white workers compared to black workers decreased by roughly two
percentage points from 12.9% to 11% (Barros et al. 379). These changes in salary based on race
and gender helped contribute to greater equality and more equal opportunities for employees in
the Brazilian labor force during this time, but only corresponded to 9% total of the decrease in
income inequality derived from income from working (Barros et al. 391).
In addition to more egalitarian pay across different races and gender, a diverse range of
factors were responsible for increases in equality in income derived from work. These factors
include increased geographic equality (minimizing payment differences between urban and rural
municipalities) as more equal pay across sectors. Of all the factors mentioned thus far,
geographic equality had the biggest impact on inequality reduction, contributing to 22% of the
reduction in inequality in income derived from work. Despite advances in other aspects, one area
where Brazil struggled to make improvements was the differential between salaries of those
employed in the formal and informal sectors. Under the Lula administration, the proportion of
workers participating in the informal sector declined, indicating progress towards higher
economic development. However, since 1996, and including the first years of the Lula
administration up to 2005, the differential in salary between workers employed formally and
informally continued to rise. From 2001 to 2005, the percentage of salary formal sector workers
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earn over informal sector workers increased from 36.4% to 40.6% (Barros et al. 384). Due to the
growing disparity between the informal and formal sectors from 2001 to 2005, changes in formal
employment in this time period were actually associated with an increase in income inequality.
Finally, increasing minimum salary is a tool that when used effectively is proven to have
the ability to reduce income inequality within a country. In Brazil, workers in the formal sector
earning minimum wage benefitted from the salary increases implemented by the Lula
administration. However, from 2001 to 2005 while minimum salary increased, so did the number
of Brazilians receiving less than minimum salary (Barros et al. 485). In Brazil, the third decile of
the population in terms of income is the group that receives a salary equal to or close to
minimum wage, and approximately 20% of citizens earn less than minimum wage. From 2001 to
2005, the income of Brazilians in the bottom quintile of the population decreased relative to
minimum wages, meaning the most vulnerable citizens did not benefit from this policy change.
This is particularly apparent in the Northeastern region of the country, where approximately 40%
of the workforce receives a salary below minimum wage (Afonso et al. 572).

DATA ANALYIS
As outlined in the literature review sections of this paper, the factors that contributed
changes in income inequality in Brazil during the Lula administration (Bolsa Família, minimum
wage increases, and formal economic growth) have different levels of effectiveness in different
areas. For example, in a large city such as São Paulo or Rio de Janeiro, an increase in minimum
wage will have less impact on income inequality because this increase is smaller relative to the
large amount of wealth possessed by the top quintile of the population. Thus, by exclusively
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looking at Brazil’s national GINI score, it is easy to overlook regional trends in inequality
reduction.
The Lula administration created many policies designed to empower workers and
eliminate national poverty, however, these programs by their nature as state run programs favor
participation in the formal sector. The government is unable to provide formal protections to
workers operating without an official work license or a government issued ID card and data
shows that Brazil is becoming a less profitable nation for those working in the informal sector.
Even Bolsa Família, a program that provides a transfer payment to low-income Brazilians
regardless of if they are employed in the formal or informal sector, favors adherence to a certain
government norm; Bolsa Família beneficiaries must have an ID card and register in person with
their municipal government before they can even be considered to receive payments.
Municipalities across Brazil are extremely different in terms of their size, geography, and socioeconomic composition and this same variation extends to municipal governments. By placing
program administration in the hands of local governments with varying levels of organization
and sophistication, the efficiency of Bolsa Família distribution is subject to variation as well.
This thesis hypothesizes that inequality reduction in Brazil during the Lula administration
would favor municipalities that were more effectively able to organize participation and
engagement with the formal sector. This implies that municipalities with higher formal
employment participation rates would be the same municipalities that were the most effective at
administrating Bolsa Família and other government programs, thus causing greater reductions in
income inequality.
To test this theory, data were sourced from the Brazilian Applied Economics Research
Institute, Fundação João Pinheiro, and United Nations Development Program’s 2013 study of
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municipal development in Brazil, The Atlas of Human Development, which covers a wide range
of standard of living indicators from education levels to population across Brazilian
municipalities (Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada et al.). The data in this report were
based on the results of the 1991, 2000, and 2010 censuses, which were administered by the
Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics. For purposes of this research, the results of the
2000 and 2010 census were compared to show changes during Lula’s presidency, which lasted
from 2003 to 2010. Additional data on Bolsa Família participation were also accessed from the
Brazilian Applied Economics Research Institute (Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada).
Data on Bolsa Família are taken annually, based on the number or beneficiaries and total
payments in every December starting in the year 2004. Census data are taken at the individual
level while all data on Bolsa Família are taken at the household level. Only the 5,565
municipalities with consistent data for both the 2000 and 2010 census were studied in this
research.
Empirical Overview of Inequality Reduction
In order to understand this line of research, it is important to address a gap in the scholarly
literature on income inequality reduction by providing an empirical overview of the high
variation municipalities across Brazil witnessed in inequality reduction. As aforementioned, from
2000 to 2010, 1,133 municipalities (approximately 20% of the total number) in Brazil saw no
improvements to income inequality, signifying the GINI coefficients of these municipalities
either remained the same or increased during this period. On average, municipalities in the North
and Northeast were less effective at reducing income inequality than the rest of the country.
From 2000 to 2010, income inequality increased or remained the same in 159 of 449 (35.4%) of
municipalities in the North, 492 of 1794 (27.4%) municipalities in the Northeast, 227 of 1,668
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(13.6%) municipalities in the Southeast, 171 of 1,188 municipalities in the South (14.4%) and 84
of 466 (18%) municipalities in the Central-West. The following table (Table 1) shows the
average municipal GINI coefficient for Brazil’s five regions and the nation as a whole.

Table 1
Region
Brazil

2000 Municipal
GINI Average
0.5471

2010 Municipal
GINI Average
0.4944

Change in Municipal
GINI Average
-0.05268

North

0.5992

0.5677

-0.03154

Northeast

0.5619

0.5251

-0.03681

Southeast

0.5295

0.4659

-0.06362

South

0.5237

0.4599

-0.06386

CentralWest

0.5617

0.4953

-0.06648

On average, municipalities in Brazil reduced their GINI coefficients by slightly over 0.05
from 2000 to 2010. The data revealed that the North and Northeastern regions of the country had
the highest income inequality at the time of the 2000 census. Despite high rates of participation
in government programs such as Bolsa Família, these regions were also less effective at reducing
income inequality than the rest of the nation. Not only was percent reduction in municipal GINI
smaller in the North and Northeast, but total reduction in income inequality was smaller in these
regions as well. This chart shows that municipalities in the southern region of the country had the
lowest average income inequality across both time periods. The Central-Western region of the
country was the winner in terms of inequality reduction, witnessing the greatest decrease in
average income inequality. As shown in Table 2 below, there was high variation within regions
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in terms of income inequality reduction, and the Central-West and North had the largest standard
deviations for this metric.
Table 2
Region

Standard Deviation of GINI
Reduction

North

0.0759

Northeast

0.0617

Southeast

0.0597

South

0.0664

Central-West

0.0794

In order to visualize income inequality reduction at the state level, the following map
(Figure 3) represents the average municipal GINI coefficient reduction of Brazil’s 26 states and
federal district, Brasilia. These scores were then broken down into five quintiles, in which the 5th
quintile saw the greatest reduction in income inequality from 2000 to 2010 and the 1st quintile
saw the least reduction in income inequality.
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Figure 3

It is worth noting that on average, municipalities in the states of Acre, Amapá, Roraima
actually saw a slight increase in income inequality during this time period and that income
inequality in Brasilia remained constant. The three states where income inequality increased are
all located in the North of the country. In the rest of the nation, average municipal income
inequality decreased at varying levels. Santa Catarina and Paraná, two states in the South of
Brazil saw the greatest average decrease in income inequality; with reductions of over .07 to
their respective GINI coefficients.
The averages conducted in this analysis were based on average municipal scores, without
weighting results for population size of the respective municipalities. Municipalities in extremely
large cities tended to have significantly less improvement in income inequality than the national
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average. Thusly, adjusting state-level GINI averages for municipal population size has a greater
impact on states such as Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo which both possess mega-cities that saw
increases in income inequality. As Brazil is a highly urbanized nation that continues to urbanize,
it is important to address the issue of urban inequality and analyze federal policies for their
effectiveness in urban areas. For reference, the 2000 and 2010 GINI coefficients of the largest
cities in each Brazilian State are included in the attached appendix.
Correlation Analysis
The preliminary empirical analysis revealed that the North and Northeastern regions were
much less successful at reducing income inequality than other regions in the nation. As these
regions also had higher income inequality in 2000, this led to the concern that municipalities
with high income inequality in 2000 were actually less likely to reduce their income inequality in
2010. To test this concern the correlation between the 2000 GINI scores and change in GINI
scores was calculated.

Correlation(2000 GINI coefficient, Δ GINI coefficient from 2000 to 2010) = -.5227

The strong negative relationship between these values indicates that municipalities with higher
2000 GINI coefficients saw a greater decrease in their respective GINI scores from 2000 to 2010.
Generally, this means that income inequality reduction was the strongest in the municipalities of
Brazil that needed it the most. However, municipalities with above average income inequality in
the North and Northeast were less effective at reducing income inequality than their counterparts
in other regions of the country.
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To test the hypothesis that successful inequality reduction was connected to
formalization, the relationship between income inequality and formal employment was
calculated.

Correlation(2000 GINI coefficient, Δ % Formal Employment from 2000 to 2010) = -.0882
Correlation(Δ GINI coefficient from 2000 to 2010, Δ % Formal Employment from 2000 to
2010) = -.0815
These values show that formal employment is associated with a slightly greater capacity to
reduce income inequality. Municipalities with high-income inequality in 2000 were less able to
increase the percent of the labor force employed in the formal sector. Additionally, the negative
relationship between the change in a municipality’s GINI coefficient and the change in its
percent of workers employed in the formal sector shows that a greater decrease in income
inequality corresponded to a greater increase in formal sector employment.
To test the relationship between Bolsa Família administrative effectiveness and
inequality reduction, this research posited that municipalities that were less effective at
implementing the program would be slower to arrive to their target number of recipients due to
poor advertising of the program and weak implementation mechanisms. Within the confines of
the available data, the annual change in total program participation is used to indicate how
effectively Bolsa Família was introduced in different municipalities. A municipality that was
less effective at registering program participants would see a greater increase in families
registered in the program after the first year of the program. To test this, municipal level
participation in the first years of the Bolsa Família program was contrasted with the municipal
level data on income inequality in Table 3.
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Table 3
Relationship Between Municipal Bolsa Família Participation and Income Inequality
Correlation(2000 GINI Coefficient, Δ Number
of Families Registered in Bolsa Família from
2004 to 2005) = 0.1211

Correlation(2010 GINI Coefficient, Δ Number
of Families Registered in Bolsa Família from
2004 to 2005) = 0.1853

Correlation(2000 GINI Coefficient, Δ Number
of Families Registered in Bolsa Família from
2004 to 2006) = 0.1316

Correlation(2010 GINI Coefficient, Δ Number
of Families Registered in Bolsa Família from
2004 to 2006) = 0.2070

Correlation(2000 GINI Coefficient, Δ Number
of Families Registered in Bolsa Família from
2004 to 2007) = 0.1322

Correlation(2010 GINI Coefficient, Δ Number
of Families Registered in Bolsa Família from
2004 to 2007) = 0.2089

Supporting the hypothesis, results of these tests show that a higher initial GINI coefficient
corresponded with a greater increase in program participation in the first years of the Bolsa
Família program. Furthermore, this research also shows that municipalities that were slower to
reach their target number of program participants tended to have a higher GINI score in 2010,
meaning that municipalities that were less successful in implementing the program had less
improvement to income inequality. While further tests are necessary to prove causation, the
results of this preliminary research shows that poor municipal organization could be an
impediment to inequality reduction, meaning that inequality reduction favors municipalities with
stronger infrastructures.
Finally, economic change and increasing power to workers were responsible for a large
amount of the progress made towards income equality in Brazil during Lula’s administration. As
Brazil is transitioning to a primarily service based economy, the role of this transition in income
inequality should be studied. To test this relationship, the correlation between changes in
participation in the service sector was contrasted to changes in municipal level income
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inequality. The metric used was the percent of employees per municipality employed in the
service sector.
Correlation(Δ GINI 2000 to 2010, Δ % employed in service sector 2000 to 2010)
= 0.1118
A greater increase in service sector employment corresponded to a greater increase in income
inequality. This could be because a higher service sector employment share, which is a feature of
growing urban regions, means incomes will rise for some workers, but the benefits of growing
urbanization do not spread to the poorer population.
Regression Analysis
To understand the major determinants in inequality reduction across Brazil, and the role
of the formal sector and economic growth in this process, I formulated a linear regression model
using R software with observations from 5,503 municipalities with recorded data from the Atlas
of Human Development and municipal level GDP data from the IBGE (IBGE). Data regarding
Bolsa Família were excluded from the model due to a lack of recorded data for a substantial
number of municipalities. The formula for this model estimates the predicted change in GINI
score (2010 GINI - 2000 GINI) based on municipal characteristics. As a fall in income inequality
is shown by a lower 2010 than 2000 GINI score, in this model, negative coefficients correspond
to a greater reduction in income inequality. The following specification was used:

Change in GINI = origgini + origform + changeform + changeservice + isnorth + isnortheast +
issouth + issoutheast + rawgdpchange
The variable origgini corresponds to the municipality’s 2000 GINI score, origform corresponds
to the municipality’s level of formal employment, measured as the percent of the workforce
employed in the formal sector. Changeform is the change in the percent of workers in the formal
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sector, and changeservice is the change in the percent of workers employed in the service sector
from 2000 to 2010. Rawgdpchange is the change in municipal average GDP per capita from
2000 to 2010. Finally, isnorth, isnortheast, issouth, and issoutheast are dummy variables for the
different regions of Brazil. Thus, a municipality that receives a score of 0 for all four of these
regional criteria would be a municipality in the last remaining region of the country, the CentralWest. The regression model yielded the following results:
Table 4
Coefficients:

Estimate

Std. Error

T value

Pr(>|t|)

(Intercept)

.3202

7.120e-03

44.979

< 2e-16 ***

originalgini

- .6443

1.053e-02

-61.198

< 2e-16 ***

originalformalemp

- .0004617

5.536e-05

-8.340

< 2e-16 ***

changeformal

- .0008676

8.296e-05

-10.459

< 2e-16 ***

changeservice

.0007963

1.313e-04

6.063

1.42e-09 ***

isnorth

.04722

3.439e-03

13.728

< 2e-16 ***

isnortheast

.01757

2.818e-03

6.235

4.85e-10 ***

issouth

- .01989

2.837e-03

-7.011

2.65e-12 ***

issoutheast

- .01558

2.710e-03

-5.747

9.60e-09 ***

rawgdpchange

.0000001803

6.758e-08

2.668

0.00766 **

Significance levels: 0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05
Residual standard error: 0.04951 on 5493 degrees of freedom
Multiple R-squared: 0.4385, Adjusted R-squared: 0.4376
F-statistic: 476.7 on 9 and 5493 DF, p-value: < 2.2e-16
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All coefficients were statistically significant, indicating that the effect of each of these estimates
differed from 0. Municipalities with high levels of formal employment in 2000 were shown to
have a larger decrease in income inequality. Furthermore, an increase in formal employment
participation was associated with a greater decrease in income inequality. This is likely due to
the increases in protections and wages for formal sector employees introduced during Lula’s
presidency, such as higher minimum wages. Municipalities more equipped to engage with the
formal sector would be able to reap more of the rewards of these programs.
As shown in the Correlation Analysis section of this paper, a higher initial GINI score
corresponds with a greater decrease in income inequality; meaning municipalities with high
income inequality in 2000 saw the most improvements during this time period. While income
inequality reduction varied greatly during this period, as a general rule, the municipalities that
had the greatest need to improve saw the most improvement, indicating a successful trend in
inequality reduction for the nation as a whole.
Increased service sector participation and increased GDP per capita, two factors
associated with economic development, were shown to be impediments to income inequality
reduction in Brazil. This implies that if GDP increases are not distributed to lower income
members of a society, there will be little improvement to income inequality as a result of this
economic development. Moreover, as Brazil transitions to a service based economy, the
relationship between service sector participation and income inequality must be monitored.
Finally, the regional variables in this regression model reveal differing levels of success
in inequality reduction across the five different regions of Brazil. Despite having access to the
same government programs and a general trend of economic growth, municipalities in the North
are estimated to have .04722 less GINI reduction than those in the control group (Central-West)
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and municipalities in the Northeast saw .01757 less reduction. The regression model revealed
encouraging results for municipalities in the South and Southeast, which are estimated to have
.01989 and .01558 greater income inequality reduction, respectively, than the control group.
Thusly, the regions of Brazil with the greatest levels of wealth and a lower regional average
GINI score in 2000 saw the greatest improvements to income inequality. This means that a
municipality with a high 2000 GINI score would be predicted to have a greater decrease in
income inequality if it were in the South or Southeast than if it were in the North or Northeast.
The results of this model show that while as a general rule income inequality decreased, the
variation between regions in inequality reduction may affirm the need for greater policy
interventions in the North and Northeast.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The pronounced income inequality and poverty reduction Brazil accomplished under the
Lula administration merits careful study. However, the findings of this research confirm that
nationally instituted programs such as minimum wage laws and government transfer payments
may be met with different levels of success at the regional level. Furthermore, despite all the
innovative programs introduced during this time, approximately one-fifth of Brazilian
municipalities did not reduce income inequality. Among the myriad of reasons income inequality
should have reduced under the Lula administration, it is almost more noteworthy that so many
municipalities failed to make improvements in this regard. The overall pattern of inequality
reduction in Brazil is uplifting for the nation’s development future, but the fact that regions with
higher historic inequality (North and Northeast) were less successful in inequality reduction
raises some concern. Income inequality is an impediment to sustained economic growth and it
can engender negative attitudes within a community. If these issues continue to have a stronger
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effect in the North and Northeast of the nation, the hope of a more egalitarian economy
throughout Brazil as a whole may be elusive.
Despite the best efforts of any effective policy, it is impossible to create a program that is
equally effective for all citizens of a country. A family with more than five children, a family
without government issued ID cards, and families that live far away from their municipal seat of
government are already at a disadvantage in terms of the value they can receive from
participation in a program like Bolsa Família. Moreover, an individual is subject to the
effectiveness of their municipal government, school, and health systems when they to participate
in Bolsa Família conditionalities. Furthermore, if additional research supports the results of this
regression analysis that variables associated with economic development, GDP per capita and
service sector employment, correspond to increased income inequality, then the path of
economic development in Brazil needs to be evaluated with a more critical lens.
This research can help pave the way and provide an empirical reference for future
research on inequality reduction in Brazil. The relationship between formal sector employment
and municipal level organization could be further assessed through descriptive data about the
different characteristics of municipal level governments and data representing government
benefit programs should be included as well. This deeper level of analysis could help explain
how neighboring municipalities in the same state can witness such different results in their GINI
score reduction.
From 2000 to 2010, the pattern of inequality reduction in Brazil shows that municipalities
that were able to operate within the boundaries of federal norms were most adept at reducing
income inequality. Incentivizing formal employment so more workers will have formal
protections and safe environments is a key step in this process; however, in Brazil these
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incentives have occurred at the detriment of those employed in the informal sector. Ultimately,
the federal government should pay particular attention to the limiting factors for income
inequality reduction across municipalities. If historic, culturally specific factors contribute to
inequality differently in different regions, a national plan to reduce inequality should allow the
flexibility to tackle these issues head on. When Brazil is able to accomplish this and provide
municipalities with the support they need to address their unique challenges, Brazil will achieve
a development model in which all regions are afforded the opportunity to flourish.
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APPENDIX
Region

State

Largest
Municipality

Municipality 2000 GINI 2010 GINI Change in
Population
Coefficient Coefficient GINI
(2010)
Coefficient
428,527
.61
.56
-.05

North

Rondônia

Porto Velho

North

Acre

Rio Branco

336,038

.61

.59

-.02

North

Roraima

Boa Vista

284,313

.57

.58

.01

North

Amazonas

Manaus

2,375,151

.62

.61

-.01

North

Pará

Belém

1,393,399

.64

.6

-.04

North

Amapá

Macapá

398,204

.60

.59

-.01

North

Tocantins

Palmas

228,332

.63

.58

-.05

Northeast

Maranhão

São Luis

1,014,837

.65

.61

-.04

Northeast

Piauí

Teresina

814,230

.64

.61

-.03

Northeast

Ceará

Fortaleza

2,452,185

.64

.61

-.03

Northeast

Rio Grande
do Norte

Natal

803,739

.63

.61

-.02

Northeast

Paraíba

João Pessoa

723,515

.62

.62

0

Northeast

Pernambuc
o

Recife

1,537,704

.67

.68

.01
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Northeast

Alagoas

Maceió

932,748

.66

.63

-.03

Northeast

Sergipe

Aracaju

571,149

.63

.62

-.01

Northeast

Bahia

Salvador

2,675,656

.64

.63

-.01

Southeast

Minas
Gerais

Belo
Horizonte

2,375,151

.61

.60

-.01

Southeast

Espírito
Santo

Villa Velha

414,586

.57

.56

-.01

Southeast

Rio de
Janeiro

Rio de
Janeiro

6,320,446

.61

.62

.01

Southeast

São Paulo

São Paulo

11,253,503

.61

.62

.01

South

Paraná

Curitiba

1,751,907

.59

.55

-.04

South

Santa
Catarina

Joinville

515,288

.54

.49

-.05

South

Rio Grande
do Sul

Porto Alegre

1,409,351

.60

.60

0

CentralWest

Mato
Grosso do
Sul
Mato
Grosso

Campo
Grande

786,797

.60

.56

-.04

Cuiabá

551,098

.63

.59

-.04

CentralWest

Goiás

Goiâna

1,302,001

.61

.58

-.03

Federal
District

Federal
District

Brasilia

2,675,656

.63

.63

0

CentralWest
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